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The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on October 31,
2000 regarding the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers,1 a case involving the jurisdictional
reach of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (CWA). 2
The issue before the Court was whether the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) can assert jurisdiction over isolated intrastate
waters solely because those waters potentially or actually serve as
a habitat for migratory birds.3 The first question the Court was
required to address was whether the Migratory Bird Rule, as
promulgated by the Corps, exceeded the authority delegated to the
Corps by Congress under the CWA.4 If the statutory construction
of the CWA by the Corps was permissible, 5 the Court would have
had to determine whether Congress exceeded its authority under
* The author would like to thank the PELR Editorial Staff, the Pace Law School
faculty and his fellow students for their encouragement and assistance in bringing
this article to publishable form. Most of all, this article is dedicated to my wife, Provi,
whose patience and support was far grater than could ever reasonably be expected.
1. 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Solid Waste III] affg 998 F. Supp.
946 (N.D. Ill. 1998) [hereinafter Solid Waste I], cert. granted, 529 U.S. 1129, (2000)
and rev'd 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter Solid Waste III].
2. Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
3. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 163; see also Final Rule for Regulatory Programs
of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). The Migratory Bird
Rule characterizes the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over waters that are actually or
potentially used as habitat by migratory birds. Id.
4. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 166.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). The plain language of the statute limits the Corps'
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the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 6 in enacting the
CWA. The ruling by the Court was initially expected to define the
extent of the statutory term "waters of the United States," and the
constitutional limits of federal land use regulation under the au-
thority of the Commerce Clause. 7
On January 9, 2001, in Solid Waste III," the Court answered
the first question in the negative. In making its decision, the
Court considered the plain meaning of the CWA and its interpre-
tation of congressional intent, but did not reach the constitutional
question regarding the limits on congressional power.9
Part II of this comment offers a brief historical perspective of
the Court's review of legislative applications of commerce power
by Congress, an overview of the sections of the CWA applicable to
the Solid Waste III case, and an overview of the recent split in
circuit court decisions relative to the principle issues under study.
Part III discusses the facts, holding and analysis of the lower
courts in Solid Waste I and Solid Waste II. Part IV contains a
critical analysis of the Court's decision in Solid Waste IL Part V
presents an inferential analysis of the constitutional questions
raised vis-A-vis limits on congressional powers not addressed by
the Court. Part VI discusses federal land use regulation using
conditional federal spending. Part VII discusses the implications
of the Solid Waste III decision on the application of federal envi-
ronmental legislation. In particular, the regulation of state and
local land use issues which have no discernible impact on inter-
state commerce will be considered, and the conclusion drawn that
the prospects for maintaining environmental integrity need not be
limited by this decision.
Part II
Supreme Court Review of Commerce Clause Use by
Congress
The Framers of the Constitution, seeking to develop a form of
government markedly different from the British monarchy, de-
signed a system of state and federal governments with distinct
6. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. (giving Congress the power to "regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States . ..
7. See Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. 159.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 168.
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powers in order to provide a degree of independence for the
states.10 James Madison explained,
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined. Those which are to re-
main in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the ob-
jects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State."
Consistent with Madison's perspective, the Court in 1819 held
that the federal government was established as one with a defined
list of enumerated powers under the Constitution. 12 The Court
took the concept of separation of powers one step further when it
added that the actions of the Congress were subject to judicial re-
view.13 Included in the enumerated powers of the national gov-
ernment is the power "to regulate commerce . . . among the
states. 1 4 The extent of this commerce power, or more specifically
the concept of what constitutes commerce, was argued from the
outset. 15
By 1824, the meaning of the term commerce was broadly de-
termined by the Court to involve "the commercial intercourse be-
tween nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, [as]
regulated by proscribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
16
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 the Court rejected the idea of limiting the
scope of commerce to the "buying and selling, or the interchange of
commodities" and excluding "navigation." 8 Congressional power
over economic matters with interstate consequences was consid-
ered exclusive in its operation and could be exercised to its fullest
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 135-38 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1981).
11. Id. at 137.
12. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is ac-
knowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.").
13. Id. at 423.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
16. Id. at 189-90.
17. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
18. Id. at 189.
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extent.19 However, the Court carefully distinguished that Con-
gress was only empowered to control "commerce . . . 'among the
several states,"' 20 and that any commerce that was thoroughly in-
ternal to a state remained reserved for the state to control. 21 The
Court also reaffirmed the principle expressed in McCullough that
any enactment made by Congress "under the pretext of executing
its powers" must be invalidated as inconsistent with the intent of
the constitution. 22
The dramatic shift of the country from an agricultural to an
industrial based society was instrumental in influencing the
Court to find that certain commercial activities, though purely in-
trastate in origin, had a sufficient effect on other states so as to
justify federal regulation. 23 In 1914, in Houston & Texas Railway
v. United States,24 the Court held that the Congress had the power
to proscribe railroad shipping rates where the intrastate commer-
cial activity had a direct effect on interstate commerce. 25 The
most dramatic extension of the use of this "Effects Doctrine" oc-
curred in 1942 with the Court's opinion in Wickard v. Filburn.26
In Wickard, the Court upheld the penalty provision of the 1938
Agricultural Adjustment Act when a farmer had grown more
wheat on his farm, albeit for personal use, than permitted under
the federal scheme.27 The Court opined that although the impact
of this individual farmer's activity was confined within the state
and minimal, it would be nonetheless significant in its cumulative
effect. 28 The Court reasoned that the production of home grown
wheat would lead a farmer to purchase less wheat on the open
market thus having a potential impact on the market price.29 Sig-
nificantly, if other farmers followed this example, the consequence
in the aggregate would have a substantial economic effect on in-
terstate commerce. 30
19. Id. at 197.
20. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3).
21. Id. at 194-95 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
22. Id. at 198; see also McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 ,422 (1819).
23. See generally Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (The
Shreveport Rate Case).
24. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
25. Id. at 355.
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. Id. at 117.
28. Id. at 127-28.
29. Id. at 128.
30. Id. at 127-28.
168 [Vol. 19
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/6
2001] THE SUPREME COURTS NEW FEDERALISM 169
The Court subsequently upheld Congress' use of the com-
merce power to enact legislation to prohibit racial discrimination
in restaurants,3 1 regulate hours and wages of state workers, 32 and
the regulation of the use of private land to ensure environmental
integrity.33 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association,34 the Supreme Court emphasized that it concurred
with "the lower federal courts that have uniformly found the
power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit
congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollu-
tion, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in
more than one state."35
The Court abruptly redirected its course in 1995. For the first
time in over fifty years, the Court decided that Congress had over-
reached its authority, and was attempting to regulate a matter
that had been traditionally left to the states.
In United States v. Lopez,36 the Court cited an absence of con-
gressional findings which would demonstrate that gun possession
in a school yard had a substantial effect on interstate commerce as
determinative of its holding that the statute was not within the
Commerce Clause authority of the Congress.37 Justice Souter
chastised the majority for refusing to apply the rational basis test
that the Court had applied for over fifty years. 38 To the contrary,
the majority expressed an adherence to the substantial effects
test,39 yet criticized the "level of generality" that could make any
activity look commercial. 40
31. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding that Congress had a
rational basis for determining that racial discrimination in a restaurant would sub-
stantially effect interstate commerce because the restaurant purchased out-of-state
goods, and interstate travel may be restricted if travelers were unsure about ob-
taining food service).
32. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (reasoning that since the state oper-
ated hospital and school supplies were purchased out-of-state, the working conditions
of the state employees could be regulated because any labor discord could effect inter-
state commerce).
33. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(finding a rational basis for requiring the mining company to restore the land to its
prior condition after mining operations were ended where the coal was an interstate
commodity).
34. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
35. Id. at 282.
36. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
37. Id. at 560.
38. Id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 566.
40. Id. at 565.
5
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
The Lopez Court identified three categories of activity that
Congress could legitimately regulate under its commerce power.41
First, "Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce."42 Second, "Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may only
come from intrastate activities."43 Third, congressional commerce
power extends to "those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." 44
In United States v. Morrison,45 the Court advocated, and clar-
ified, the analytical framework that the Lopez Court utilized to
conduct its analysis of the constitutionality of the congressional
enactment in question. 46 This methodology involves the determi-
nation whether: (1) the intrastate activity is an economic endeavor
and "substantially affects" interstate commerce; 47 (2) the statute
is designed and enforced to influence or proscribe the rules of the
economic activity;48 (3) the legislative history includes congres-
sional findings regarding the effect of the activity upon interstate
commerce; 49 and (4) there is a reasonable nexus between the ac-
tivity and the substantial effect on commerce. 50
In Morrison, a victim of a gender-based crime had sought a
federal remedy under the Violence Against Women Act. 51 The
Court applied the analytical framework and "reject[ed] the argu-
ment that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on inter-
state commerce." 52 The Court held that: (1) the violent act was
not an economic activity;53 (2) the statute contained no jurisdic-
tional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in
41. Id. at 558.
42. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)).
43. Id. (citing The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
44. Id. at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
45. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
46. Id. at 609.
47. Id. at 610.
48. Id. at 611.
49. Id. at 612.
50. Id. at 611-12.
51. See Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
53. Id. at 618 (explaining that regardless of whether violence had an economic
effect in the aggregate violence was, in itself, not an economic activity).
[Vol. 19170
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pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce;
5 4
(3) the congressional findings were not sufficient, by themselves,
"to sustain the constitutionality of the statute;"55 and (4) the stat-
ute did not regulate an activity with a sufficient nexus to inter-
state commerce.
56
The majority in Morrison reasoned that it was returning to its
traditional roots, as expressed in Gibbons, by basing its decision
on the need to maintain a separation of powers between federal
and state governments. 57 In contrast to the finding in Lopez, the
Morrison Court opined that the detailed congressional findings re-
flected so much of an "aggregate effect" that application of the
commerce power would involve the risk of unbounded federal in-
volvement into areas traditionally reserved for the states.58 The
decisive issue, however, was neither the effect on the principle of
separation of powers nor the substantial effect of an activity on
interstate commerce. 59 In Morrison, the "substantial effect" test
had been supplanted by a "new criterion of review."60 The princi-
ple focus of the Court would now be on the economic nature of the
intrastate activity, 61 albeit characterized as recapturing the origi-
nal mission of the Court to distinguish between local and national
activities.62
54. Id. at 611-12 (asserting that Congress established the "remedy over a wider,
and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.").
55. Id. at 614-15 (the congressional findings relative to the substantial interstate
effect of violent crimes against women were substantially weakened in the view of the
Court because the aggregate "but-for" effect it created would substantially impact
"employment, production, transit or consumption" to such an extent that it would jus-
tify regulation of all criminal or family law matters that are traditionally areas of
state regulation).
56. Id. at 612 (asserting that "the link between gun possession and substantial
effect on interstate commerce was attenuated.").
57. Id. at 616 n.7 (reasoning that the Gibbons principle of a distinct separation of
federal and state authority would be undermined).
58. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
59. See id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that "the very notion of a
'substantial effects' test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original
understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court's early Commerce Clause
cases.").
60. Id. at 637.
61. See id. at 639 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (insisting that the majority would ex-
clude from possible consideration any activity, even if had commercial affects, "when
the activity regulated is not itself commercial or when the States have traditionally
addressed it in the exercise of [its] general police power.").
62. See id. at 617-18 ("In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few princi-
ples that has been consistent since the [Commerce] Clause was adopted.").
7
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Justice Breyer forewarned that reviving "the distinction be-
tween commercial and non-commercial conduct," first rejected in
Wickard, "can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior
mistakes."63 He criticized the majority for its myopia in conclud-
ing that the Gibbons Court's theory of limiting governmental ac-
tivities based on the enumerated powers of the Constitution
meant that "some particular categories of subject matter are
therefore presumptively beyond the reach of the commerce
power."64
The findings of both the Lopez and Morrison Courts were also
consistent with the theory expressed by Justice Marshall in Mc-
Cullough that some "ends" are inappropriate for national control,
albeit for different reasons. Justice Marshall had interpreted the
Necessary and Proper Clause65 to mean that Congress may not
legislate beyond its authority through the pretextual use of an
enumerated power. 66 The Court in Morrison, on the other hand,
reasoned that the statute under review must be designed to regu-
late an appropriate economic activity in order to be
constitutional. 67
The Clean Water Act
Congress enacted the CWA to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
water."68 The CWA forbids the discharge of fill materials into
"navigable waters"69 without a Section 404(a) permit from the
Corps.70 "Navigable waters" are broadly defined in the statute as
"waters of the United States."71
63. Id. at 643.
64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
66. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819).
67. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("Simply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so." (quoting United States v. Lopez, 529 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (quoting Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981))).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001) (granting the Corps authority to issue Section 404
permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters").
71. Definitions of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1998) (de-
fining the term "waters of the United States" to include "waters such as intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degra-
dation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.").
172 [Vol. 19
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The Corps is responsible for reviewing the permit applications
for compliance with guidelines promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and grants the permit unless it is con-
trary to the public interest. 72 To fall within the scope of the regu-
latory program the activity must involve the discharge of fill
material, defined as the addition of "any material used for the pri-
mary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of
changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody,"73 into the "waters
of the United States."
Neither the statute nor the implementing regulations directly
address whether isolated wetlands are included or excluded from
application of the CWA. Wetlands are recognized as providing
"significant natural biological functions, including food chain pro-
duction, general habitat and nesting, spawning, rearing and rest-
ing sites for aquatic or land species."74 For a wetland to be
protected under the plain language of the CWA, it would have to
qualify as a "navigable water." The CWA provides no further defi-
nition of the waters to which the Corps' jurisdiction extends; 75
however, as indicated, the regulations define "navigable waters"
as "waters of the United States" which does include wetlands.
In 1986, the Corps asserted that Section 404 extended to in-
trastate waters:
a. which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines; or
c. which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species;
or
d. used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce. 76
72. General Policies for Evaluating Permit Applications, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1)
(1998). Public interest review evaluates the probable impacts, including cumulative
impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest, and con-
sideration of the impact of the proposed activity on wetlands. Id.
73. Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material Into Waters of the United
States, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1998) ("[T]he term does not include any pollutant dis-
charged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated
under Section 402 of the [CWA].").
74. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(i) (1998).
75. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
76. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
9
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Under this Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps had previously as-
serted its jurisdiction based on the use of the isolated wetlands as
a habitat by the migratory birds.77 In Solid Waste 11, the Seventh
Circuit agreed.78 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Wilson 79 rejected this reasoning and held that, "waters of the
United States" are restricted to those waters that are navigable,
and if not navigable, those which are "interstate or closely con-
nected to navigable or interstate waters."80 The Wilson court ac-
cordingly declined to review "the extent and limits of
congressional power to regulate non-navigable waters" as being
beyond the scope of legislative authority.8 1
In Solid Waste III, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the discrepancy between the two circuits.8 2 It was not the
first time that the Court had been asked to interpret Section 404,
although the Court had not previously been asked to answer the
question whether the Corps had authority to regulate discharges
of fill material into wetlands that were not adjacent to bodies of
open water.8 3 In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,8 4 the
Court upheld the application of the CWA to an intrastate wetland
adjacent to a navigable intrastate lake.8 5 In Riverside Bayview
Homes, the Court reasoned that the wetlands directly impacted
the quality of the lake water by serving as a natural filtration sys-
tem.8 6 In doing so, the Court acknowledged the ambiguity of the
CWA legislative history and policies underlying its statutory grant
77. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1995) [herein-
after Leslie Salt III], cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955
(1995) (upholding decision that isolated intrastate wetlands used or potentially used
as a habitat by migratory birds are subject to the CWA).
78. Solid Waste 11, 191 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 1999).
79. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
80. Id. at 257 (opining that, "as a matter of statutory construction, one would
expect that the phrase 'waters of the United States' when used to define the phrase
'navigable waters' refers to waters which, if not navigable in fact, are at least ...
closely related to navigable or interstate waters.").
81. Id. at 256.
82. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 165-66.
83. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-32 n.8
(1985) (indicating specifically that the Court was "not called upon to address the ques-
tion of the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands
that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.").
84. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
85. Id. at 134.
86. Id. at 133-34 n.9 (clarifying that the Court did not hold that "every adjacent
wetland is of great importance to the environment of adjoining bodies of water," but
that, in itself, did not limit the role of the Corps in evaluating the request and decid-
ing to either issue or deny a permit).
174 [Vol. 19
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of authority, but nonetheless opined that the extrinsic factors sup-
ported the reasonableness of the Corps' inclusion of adjacent wa-
ters as "waters of the United States."87 The Court noted
congressional approval of the Corps' regulations interpreting the
CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.88 As indi-
cated, the Court expressly reserved judgment on the application of
the CWA to an isolated intrastate wetland,8 9 but it did conclude
that "the language, policies and history of the Clean Water Act
compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpret-
ing the Act to require permits for the discharge of fill materials
into wetlands adjacent to the 'waters of the United States."' 90
Thus, even though the Court's reasoning in Riverside Bayview
Homes was limited to wetlands "adjacent" to navigable waters, the
expressed acceptance of the Corps' statutory construction pro-
vided an indication of disagreement with the opinion of the Wil-
son court.9 1 This decision did not guarantee that the Corps'
jurisdiction over all "waters of the United States" should extend to
isolated, intrastate wetlands.
The Split in Circuit Court Decisions and Their Relevance to
the Review of Solid Waste III by the Supreme Court
Since 1992, three circuit courts, in conflicting decisions, have
addressed the issue of isolated, intrastate wetlands.92
87. Id. at 131.
88. Id. at 135-37 (congressional interest in protection of aquatic ecosystems re-
flected its intent to include wetlands as "waters of the United States.").
89. Id. at 131-32 n.8 (declining to "address the question of the authority of the
Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to
bodies of open water.").
90. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 139.
91. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 256-57 (stating that non-navigable
waters were beyond the scope of legislative authority unless they were "closely re-
lated" to navigable waters which the court left undefined).
92. See Leslie Salt III, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding decision that
isolated intrastate wetlands used or potentially used as a habitat by migratory birds
are subject to the CWA); see also Hoffman Homes v. Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Hoffman Homes II] (overruling decision in Hoffman I that isolated wetlands were not
subject to the CWA, and holding that the potential use of the area by migratory birds
was sufficient to establish the requisite nexus between a wetland and interstate com-
merce). But see Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257 (concluding that the regulation promulgated
by the Corps, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), impermissibly expands the statutory phrase
"waters of the United States" beyond its reasonable limit).
11
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In Hoffman Homes I, the Seventh Circuit held that the appli-
cation of the CWA was unreasonable and invalid.93 Based on a
review of the statute's plain language and legislative history, the
court reasoned that since there was no discussion of isolated wet-
lands, it was not reasonable to apply the CWA in the matter before
the court. 94 The court further opined that since isolated wetlands
have no connection to any other body of water, they did not fur-
ther the purpose of the CWA to restore or maintain the integrity of
the Nation's waters.95 Finally, the court rejected the argument
that the potential use of the wetlands by migratory birds provided
a sufficient connection with interstate commerce where there was
no evidence as to how filling the wetlands area in question would
affect some human economic activity associated with the area.96
The opinion of the court as to the constitutionality of the statute
borrows heavily from Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opin-
ion in Virginia Mining.97 In finding the statute invalid, the court
asserted that "some activities may be so private and local in na-
ture that they simply may not be in commerce." 98
In Hoffman Homes II, the Seventh Circuit retracted both its
statutory and constitutional holdings and accepted an interpreta-
tion of the regulation allowing migratory birds as the nexus be-
tween a wetland and interstate commerce. 99 The court explained
that it was reasonable for the agency to interpret the regulation as
extending its jurisdiction to waters where the connection with in-
terstate commerce was "potential rather than actual, minimal
rather than substantial."100 The court reasoned that the potential
use of waters by migratory birds was sufficient to invoke Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction because "[t]hroughout North America,
millions of people annually spend more than a billion dollars on
93. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 961
F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Hoffman Homes I].
94. Id. at 1316.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1321.
97. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311
(1981)(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (absent the requisite nexus between interstate com-
merce and the geographical area, the court opined that "it is clear that there is no
rationale basis" to establish a regulation).
98. Id. at 310; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000)
(majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist) (stating that Congressional action must
distinguish "between what is truly national and what is truly local.").
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hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds."101 The court
nevertheless ruled in favor of the developer because the EPA had
not presented sufficient evidence that the water was a suitable or
potential habitat for migratory birds because the only source of
water was rainfall, and it was wet only part of the year.10 2 The
court concluded that "[a]fter April showers, not every temporary
wet spot necessarily becomes subject to governmental action."10 3
In Leslie Salt 11, 104 the Ninth Circuit reached a different con-
clusion, determining that the potential presence of migratory
birds in a seasonal wetland area created as a by-product of indus-
trial land use provided a sufficient connection to interstate com-
merce to allow the Corps to apply the CWA.105 The manufacturer
subsequently stipulated to a restoration plan and a fine, thereby
preserving the successor owner's right to appeal whether the fines
were mandatory. 10 6
Cargill, the successor in interest to Leslie Salt Company,
sought review by the Supreme Court of the circuit court's ruling in
Leslie Salt I that supported the Corps' interpretation of the CWA
as extending jurisdiction to habitat used by migratory birds. 10 7
The application to the Court for certiorari was denied.108 How-
ever, Justice Thomas' dissent is relevant to a consideration of the
constitutional questions not considered by the Court in Solid
Waste 111. 109
In Cargill, the question raised on certiorari was whether "the
... Corps, under the [CWAI, can constitutionally assert jurisdic-
tion over private property based solely on the actual or potential
presence of migratory birds that cross state lines."110 In his dis-
sent to the majority's refusal to grant certiorari, Justice Thomas
asserted that "there was no showing that petitioner's land use
101. Id.
102. Id. at 262
103. Id.
104. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990) remanded for determination of which property is
subject to jurisdiction under CWA, Leslie Salt 1, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
105. Id. at 359-60 (noting that the CWA violation occurred as a result of the effort
by the manufacturer to cure an air pollution citation by plowing over abandoned salt
basins which created an environment for vegetation and migratory birds during the
wet seasons).
106. Leslie Salt III, 55 F.3d 1388,1392 (9th Cir. 1995) cert. denied sub nom. Cargill,
Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
107. See Cargill, 516 U.S. at 955.
108. Id.
109. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 955-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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would have any effect on interstate commerce" because it was not
"usable in interstate commerce,""' and the Corps does not have
"carte blanche authority to regulate every property that migratory
birds use or could use as habitat."1 2 He proffered that "[t]his case
raises serious and important constitutional questions about the
limits of federal land use regulation in the name of the [CWAI that
provide a compelling reason to grant certiorari in this case."" 3
Justice Thomas distinguished the reasoning applied in Hoffman
Homes If from the present case by indicating that he "did not chal-
lenge Congress' power to preserve migratory birds and their
habitat through legitimate means."1 4 Such regulation, however,
requires the presence of an economic activity that must "substan-
tially affect interstate commerce." 1 5 The only documented activ-
ity at the site was the seasonal visits of the migratory birds
leading Thomas to conclude there was no economic activity affect-
ing interstate commerce."16
Wilson was decided by the Fourth Circuit shortly after the Lo-
pez decision was reached, and its effect is reflected in the circuit
court's reasoning. In Wilson, the Fourth Circuit suggested that
defining "'waters of the United States' to include intrastate waters
that need have nothing to do with navigable or interstate waters,
expands the statutory phrase ... beyond its definitional limit."" 7
The majority opined, in dicta, that extending the application of the
CWA to waters other than those adjacent to navigable waters was
"substantially beyond the regulations that had been approved in
Riverside Bayview Homes,""18 and exceeded the constitutional ba-
sis for the CWA. 119
Writing separately, Judge Luttig declined to accept this part
of the majority statement.' 20 Judge Luttig distinguished the ma-
jority's opinion that the regulation cannot exceed the limits im-
posed by the Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview Homes from its
111. Id. at 959 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113. Cargill, 516 U.S. at 959. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opining that the assertion of jurisdiction by the
Corps was untenable given the Courts rejection of the economic basis for jurisdiction
in Lopez).
116. See id. at 956 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997).
118. Id. at 258.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring) (finding majority interpretation of the
Commerce Clause too expansive).
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decision in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univer-
sity.121 In Brzonkala, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the decision
of the Supreme Court in Lopez, restricting the application of fed-
eral regulation to activities which substantially affect interstate
commerce, to be limited in scope, and inapplicable to the extension
of regulatory authority proposed by the Violence Against Women
Act. 122
The Fourth Circuit's majority opinion in Wilson was consis-
tent, albeit for different reasons, with its decision in Tabb Lakes
Ltd. v. United States. 123 That decision affirmed the holding in the
lower court, where the district judge reasoned that the Corps did
not have regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA over all wetlands,
but only over the "waters of the United States" because the Corps
had promulgated the Migratory Bird Rule without following the
notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.124 The district court declined to decide, but did opine,
that the potential use of the property as a migratory bird habitat
was sufficient to establish the necessary nexus to interstate
commerce.
125
In Wilson, however, the Fourth Circuit did not conclusively
address whether a connection between interstate commerce and
the wetland was facilitated by the presence of migratory birds. In-
stead, the court presumed that Congress could regulate "the dis-
charge of pollutants into non-navigable waters to the extent
necessary to protect the use or potential use of navigable wa-
ters.' 26 The court, considering the impact of Lopez, opined that
the reach of federal jurisdiction would be limited, but that the "po-
tential use" of the wetlands in interstate commerce would not be
sufficient to justify federal regulation. 127
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit took an alternate route in
Gibbs v. Babbitt128 where it held that "Congress may constitution-
ally address the problem of protecting endangered species" 129 by
121. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc, opinion vacated, and on reh'g en
banc 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), and affd sub nom.United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (1999).
122. Id.
123. 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) affg 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988).
124. Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 727.
125. Id. at 728.
126. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1997).
127. Id.
128. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 506.
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asserting jurisdiction, under the Commerce Clause, to enact a reg-
ulation that limits the taking of red wolves on private land.130
The majority reasoned that the protection of the red wolf was inte-
gral to ongoing scientific study, tourism and potential trade
value. 131 The court concluded that these factors, together with an
historical congressional interest in protecting endangered species
satisfied the requirement of demonstrating a substantial impact
on interstate commerce, and thus established a rational basis to
exercise jurisdiction under current Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. 132 The court did not, however, require clearly demonstra-
ble findings to support its conclusions, and was not persuaded by
arguments relying on efforts to minimize the impact of taking a
single red wolf,133 or asserting the state's police powers to regulate
local land use.' 34 Instead, the court distinguished the statutes
held invalid in Lopez and Morrison based on the long-standing
history of federal efforts to preserve scarce resources, whereas the
interests sought to be protected in Lopez and Morrison have never
become a permanent feature of the national political agenda. 135
The dissent argued that killing all of the red wolves residing
on private property would not reach the level of economic activity
held by the Court in Morrison or Lopez required to be of concern to
the Commerce Clause, 36 "if it could be said to constitute an eco-
nomic activity at all."1 37 Similarly to his opinion in Wilson,138
Judge Luttig criticized the majority in Gibbs for taking an overly
expansive view of the Commerce Clause, stating that the majority
was reasoning in error that "[tihe political, not the judicial, pro-
cess is the appropriate arena for the resolution of this particular
dispute.1 39 Judge Luttig emphasized that the "Court in Lopez
and Morrison has left no doubt" that the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause rests "with the judiciary," and in this case the
court should have followed the precedent set forth by the majority
decisions in Morrison and Lopez. 140
130. Id. at 486.
131. Id. at 494-95.
132. Id. at 497.
133. Id. at 497-98.
134. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499-500.
135. See id. at 500.
136. Id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
138. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 261 (4th Cir. 1997).
139. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 509 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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Part III
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers-the Lower Court
Decisions
The issues which arose from the attempt of the Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) to create a multi-
county landfill on an area utilized as a habitat by migratory birds
were two-fold:
1. Whether the Corps, consistent with the CWA and the Com-
merce Clause, may assert jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate
wetlands based on the actual or potential use of those waters by
migratory birds;141
2. Whether the Corps may reasonably interpret the CWA to ex-
tend to isolated, intrastate wetlands based on their actual or po-
tential use as a habitat for migratory birds. 142
This case concerned the future of a 533-acre parcel of land
that SWANCC intended to partially use for a non-hazardous
waste landfill. 143 The area was used as a gravel-mining pit ap-
proximately fifty years ago, leaving behind a maze of trenches and
surface depressions.14 4 The land has evolved into a woodland in-
cluding over 170 species of plants, 200 seasonal and permanent
ponds, and is populated by a variety of small animals and over 100
species of birds. 145 The site is the seasonal home to many migra-
tory birds; in particular it contains the "second largest breeding
colony of great blue herons in northeastern Illinois, with approxi-
mately 192 nests as of 1993."146 The plans required 17.6 acres of
ponds and small lakes to be filled as part of the site develop-
ment, 147 and SWANCC had agreed to certain mitigation efforts
while obtaining all required state and local permits and approv-
als. 148
The action arose when the Corps asserted jurisdiction over
fifty-five acres of the land, which were deemed navigable waters
141. Solid Waste H, 191 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Solid Waste 1, 998 F. Supp. 946, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
145. See Solid Waste H, 191 F.3d at 848.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Petitioner's Brief, at 5, Solid Waste I, 998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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under the CWA, 149 and denied the petitioner a permit to develop
the property. 150 The Corps had initially determined that the prop-
erty did not meet the statutory definition of "waters of the United
States," and did not fall within the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction
when SWANCC first inquired whether a Section 404(a) permit
was required to fill in certain seasonal and permanent ponds.15 '
The Corps apparently changed its position when informed by the
Illinois Nature Preserves Commission that migratory birds had
been observed on the property, thus making the use of the site
subject to the CWA.' 52
The district court granted summary judgment to the Corps on
the jurisdictional issue, holding that "the Commerce Clause au-
thorizes the federal government to regulate isolated intrastate
waters that provide a habitat for migratory birds even if the par-
ticular birds on the site do not substantially affect interstate com-
merce."115 3 The court reasoned that if, as a factual matter, an
intrastate waterway is a habitat, then it is subject to jurisdiction
under the CWA.154 The court stated that "migratory birds have
long been a proper subject for federal Commerce Clause regula-
tion," and the power to protect the habitats in which they live is a
reasonable corollary of this political interest.15 5 The court elabo-
rated on its concerns with the cumulative effect of its decision,
opining that "[w]hile the destruction of a single habitat is unlikely
to effect the viability of migratory bird populations, the destruc-
tion of numerous such habitats may, in the aggregate, have a sub-
stantial effect on their livelihood."1 56 With regard to the statutory
interpretation, the district court decided that the plain language
of the CWA revealed the congressional intent to protect wildlife, 57
149. See Solid Waste 11, 191 F.3d at 847; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001).
150. See Solid Waste I, 998 F. Supp. at 948; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
151. See Solid Waste 1, 998 F. Supp. at 948 (stating that the Corps initially deter-
mined that the site contained no wetlands nor supported any vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
152. Solid Waste I, 998 F. Supp. at 948-49; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
153. Solid Waste I, 998 F. Supp. at 952.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 497 (4th Cir. 2000).
156. Solid Waste 1, 998 F. Supp. at 952; see also Hoffman Homes 11, 999 F.2d 256,
261 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing that the cumulative loss of habitat has impacted the
potential ability of people to observe, trap and hunt many species of birds due to the
dramatic reduction in their populations).
157. See Solid Waste 1, 998 F. Supp. at 954 (noting that the the statute's purposes
were to "restore and maintain ... biological integrity. . . ," and achieve "the protection
and propagation of... wildlife," and that the statute authorized the agency to promul-
gate regulations to achieve these purposes).
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and it was reasonable for the Corps to extend the definition of
"waters of the United States" to include any waters used by migra-
tory birds. 158
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the constitutional
question whether Congress had the authority to regulate isolated,
intrastate waters under the cumulative impact doctrine. 159 The
court stressed that "Lopez expressly recognized, and in no way dis-
approved, the cumulative impact doctrine." 60 The question before
the court, therefore, was whether the destruction of the natural
habitats of migratory birds in the aggregate substantially affects
interstate commerce. 16 ' If so, the Corps would have a legitimate
constitutional basis to assert jurisdiction over the isolated activity
in question under the CWA. The circuit court held that the de-
struction of the habitats did in fact have an aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. 162 The court asserted that jurisdiction over
isolated, intrastate waters based on their actual use as a habitat
by migratory birds is a permissible exercise of Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. 63 The court also concluded that
the Corps acted reasonably in interpreting that the CWA applied
to isolated, intrastate wetlands based on their actual use by mi-
gratory birds. 6 4 The court reasoned that the land was an actual
habitat for migratory birds and that large economic expenditures
are incurred throughout the country relating to the observing,
trapping and hunting of these myriad species, but did not require
that these activities be actually taking place at the site. 65 The
court clearly stated that it must be an "actual habitat," and this
fact was established in this case.' 66 The court discounted the ar-
158. Id. at 954-55.
159. Solid Waste H, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that the "cumulative
impact" doctrine considers the scope of the Commerce Clause to include regulation of
local activity which when taken alone does not have a substantial economic effect on




162. Id. ("T]he destruction of migratory bird habitat and the attendant decrease in
the populations of these birds 'substantially effects' interstate commerce. The effect
may not be observable as each isolated pond used by the birds for feeding, nesting,
and breeding is filled, but the aggregate effect is clear, and that is all the Commerce
Clause requires.").
163. Id. at 850-51.
164. Id.
165. Solid Waste H, 191 F.3d at 853.
166. Id.
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gument that this ruling would blur the lines of what is national
and what is truly local, indicating that the presence of federal
treaties and statutes reflects the historical national concern over
the issue. 167
As to the statutory issue, the circuit court determined that
the statute itself defined the jurisdictional reach of the CWA. The
court reviewed the plain language of the statute and affirmed the
decision of the district court that the intent of Congress to pre-
serve wildlife as well as water quality is evident from a plain lan-
guage reading of the statute.168 The court also indicated that "it is
well established that the geographical scope of the Act reaches as
many waters as the Commerce Clause allows."169 Petitioner had
argued that the finding in Wilson precluded this; however, the cir-
cuit court distinguished the case at bar based on (1) the actual use
of the land by the migratory birds, and (2) that the use of the land
in the manner proposed would have an immediate effect on the
migratory birds and interstate commerce. 170
Part IV
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers-the Supreme Court
Decision
As previously indicated, when the Court accepted this case it
was asked to decide whether the provisions of the CWA could ex-
tend to isolated, intrastate wetlands and, if so, whether Congress
could delegate such authority under the Commerce Clause. The
Court answered the first question in the negative and concluded
that it need not reach the constitutional question regarding the
limits on congressional power. 171
The majority argued that this approach was consistent with
its historically "prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitu-
tional issues and [its] assumption that Congress does not casually
authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push
the limit of congressional authority."17 2 The Federalist philosophy
of the Court is predominately reflected in its emphasis that the
167. See id. at 851.
168. Id. at 852.
169. Id. at 851.
170. Id. at 851-52.
171. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
172. Id. at 172-73.
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decision prevented "a significant impingement of the States' tradi-
tional and primary power over land and water use."173 The Court
was also clear as to its perspective on the constitutional question
stating that it has interpreted the CWA "to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised"1 74 by the Corps'
interpretation, and found no congressional intent to the con-
trary.1 75 The dissent criticized the majority for invalidating the
Migratory Bird Rule and redrawing the "jurisdictional line,"176
but did acknowledge that "the ecological connection between the
wetlands and the nearby waters had played a central role" in the
Court's decision in Riverside Bayview Homes, implicitly acknowl-
edging that this connection was not present in Solid Waste III.1
7 7
The majority argument focused on the absence of support for
the Migratory Bird Rule in either the plain language of the
CWA, 178 or the legislative history of congressional activity.' 79 The
majority refused to extend jurisdiction of the CWA beyond the ex-
tent of the finding in Riverside Bayview Homes that required a
"significant nexus between the wetlands and the 'navigable wa-
ters."' 180 The dissent, to the contrary, argued that Congress had
approved the Corps' understanding of its jurisdiction when it en-
acted the 1976 Amendments to the CWA,18 ' and that the Court
should give deference to the regulatory interpretation of the Corps
vis-a-vis its Migratory Bird Rule.' 8 2 Justice Stevens argued that
the Court's finding in Riverside Bayview Homes reflected a con-
gressional crossing of "the legal watershed" from navigable waters
to marshes and inland lakes, and that "there is no principled rea-
son for limiting the statute's protection to those waters or wet-
lands that happen to lie near a navigable stream.' 8 3
The majority acknowledged that the Corps expanded the defi-
nition of "navigable waters" in 1977 when it issued regulations
that broadly defined "waters of the United States" to include "iso-
173. Id. at 174.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 176 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
178. See id. at 167.
179. See Id. at 168 n.3.
180. Id. at 167; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121,
131-32 n.8 (1985).
181. See Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lated wetlands,"184 but refused to infer congressional acquiescence
based on a failure to pass legislation to overturn the 1977 regula-
tions. 18 5 The dissent admitted that it is also "chary of attributing
significance to Congress' failure to act,"186 but assumed that the
failure to act reflects a reasonableness of the agency construction
and justifies acquiescence. 187 The dissent concurs that the major-
ity is persuaded that Congress intended to regulate wetlands ad-
jacent to navigable waters, but maintained that such a position
infers the acceptance of a broader definition of "waters of the
United States" as reflected in the Court's decision in Riverside
Bayview Homes.188 The dissent concluded that the Court was
wrong in not following its own precedent set in Riverside Bayview
Homes.189
The majority found no indication of Congressional intent to
support the proposed jurisdiction. 190 Absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, the majority insisted that the Court must in-
terpret the statute in a manner that would avoid raising "serious
constitutional problems." 191 Had the Court agreed with the statu-
tory construction proposed by the Corps and the dissent, the con-
stitutional question of whether the CWA falls within Congress'
power to regulate intrastate activities under the Commerce
Clause would have required resolution.
The majority stated that in order to reach a decision on the
"significant constitutional questions.. .[they] would have to evalu-
ate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substan-
tially affects interstate commerce." 192 The majority was critical of
the Corps for asserting that the landfill is "of plainly commercial
184. Id. at 160; see also 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978).
185. Id. at 170.
186. Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
189. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 187.
190. Id. at 172; see also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (stating that navi-
gable waters refers to waters that are "navigable in fact" and that are "susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce"); see also United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940) (indicating that the
phrase "navigable waters" covers waters that are navigable in fact and those that
could be made navigable with improvements).
191. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at 173; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1998) ("[Wlhere an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such con-
struction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.").
192. Solid Waste IIl, 531 U.S. at 173.
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value" since the circuit court had rendered its decision after con-
sidering the argument that the use of the land as a habitat by the
migratory birds was the interstate economic activity at issue. 193
The majority went no further than to deny "administrative defer-
ence.' 94 However, the dissent indicated that it was within the
"class of activities" that should be considered in an "affects"
analysis.195
Part V
An Inferential Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision in
Solid Waste III: Does the Activity in These Isolated
Intrastate Wetlands Meet the Requirements of the
"Substantial Affect" Doctrine as Currently Interpreted by
the Court?
The proposition put forth by Justice Stevens in his dissent in
Solid Waste III that judicial review involving the Commerce
Clause should analyze the "class of activities" involved, echoes the
Court's decision in Perez v. United States.196 The Court has more
recently limited the permissible reach of the Commerce Clause,
rejecting efforts to regulate areas deemed within the realm of
traditional state authority. 97
Chief Justice Rehnquist 98 and Justice Thomas, 199 in particu-
lar, have made their pro-federalism stance clear on issues similar
to those present in the Solid Waste III case. 200 As Justice Thomas
indicated, "I do not challenge Congress' power to preserve migra-
193. Id. at 173-74.
194. Id. at 174.
195. Id. at 192-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (noting that it is the class of regulated activities to be
considered in an "affects" Commerce Clause analysis); see Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. at
193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (noting that
just because Congress concludes that an activity substantially affects commerce does
not sustain its regulation under the Commerce Clause); and United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 616 n.6 (2000) (noting that the but-for causal chain implied in a
substantial affects analysis must have its limits in justifying the regulation of activi-
ties under the Commerce Clause).
198. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
311 (1981).
199. See, e.g., Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955,959 (1995) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
200. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) ("the concern that we
expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely oblit-
erate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority seems well
founded."); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
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tory birds and their habitat through legitimate means. However,
that ... does not give the Corps carte blanche authority to regu-
late every property that migratory birds use or could use as a
habitat."20 1 The issue of concern for Justice Thomas is whether
the application of the CWA under the Commerce Clause meets the
then-current constitutional test of whether the activity to be regu-
lated "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 20 2
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court has recognized three broad
categories of activity that Congress can regulate under the Com-
merce Clause: (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) commercial
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 20 3 The
isolated intrastate wetlands at issue in Solid Waste III must meet
the requirements under the third category of activity if their regu-
lation by Congress or its agency is to be found constitutional
under the Commerce Clause.
The Court has historically interpreted channels of interstate
commerce to include waters that are navigable in fact, 204or adja-
cent and directly impacting navigable waters. 20 5 In Cargill, Jus-
tice Thomas suggested a broader interpretation when he opined
that the "other waters" regulatory provision 20 6 requires only that
the activity "could [have an] affect" on interstate commerce. 20 7 He
reasoned that the use of the waters as a potential habitat by mi-
gratory birds could extend the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction to
those waters, 20 8 but did not extend this analogy so as to include
the waters themselves as channels of interstate commerce. De-
spite his apparent willingness to extend the Corps' jurisdiction,
Justice Thomas was unwilling to base it solely on the flight path of
the birds.20 9 This argument is consistent with past decisions of
201. Cargill, 516 U.S. at 959 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
202. See id.
203. See Lopez, 514 U.S at 558-59; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
204. See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171-74 (1979) (cit-
ing inter alia, United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940)) (finding
isolated ponds and ditches cannot constitute navigable waters within this Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
205. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
206. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
207. Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 958 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
208. Id.
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the Court that held that wild birds are ferae naturae,210 and not
"instrumentalities of commerce."21'
The Court in Kaiser Aetna reasoned that traditional Com-
merce Clause analysis should be used to determine whether a par-
ticular regulation is appropriately enforced under the commerce
power. 212 That case, as here, involved the third category of activ-
ity as further defined by Lopez and Morrison.
According to the circuit court in Solid Waste II, the activity
passed the "substantial affect" test as expressed in Lopez.213 Had
the majority extended the statutory jurisdiction of the Corps, the
question before the Court would have been whether the activity
continued to pass that test after Morrison.21 4 The "substantial af-
fects" test, as established in Lopez and as modified in Morrison,
requires: (1) the intrastate activity to be economic in nature215
and substantially affect interstate commerce; 21 6 (2) the statute is
designed and enforced to influence or proscribe the rules of the
economic activity;21 7 (3) the legislative history includes congres-
sional findings reasonably related to the effect of the activity on
interstate commerce; 218 and (4) there is a reasonable nexus be-
tween the activity and the interstate commerce. 21 9
In Solid Waste 1I, the activity under review was the potential
or actual use of the site as a habitat by migratory birds, and the
interstate commerce was the hunting, trapping and observation of
the migratory birds. 220 The facts in the case at hand suggest: (1)
the site evolved as the by-product of industrial land use, and was
not a natural habitat; (2) there was no showing that humans ever
went onto the property to hunt, trap or observe the migratory
210. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (finding that un-
til captured, the birds belong to no one).
211. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
212. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979).
213. Solid Waste 11, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Lopez, 514 U.S at
564.
214. See Solid Waste 11, 191 F.3d at 845.
215. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); see also Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 564.
216. Morrison,529 U.S. at 610; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (stating that the
activity cannot be so local and private in nature that it cannot be commercial); see
also Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 959 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the land must be usable in interstate commerce).
217. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
218. Id. at 612.
219. Id. at 615 (an aggregate effect is too attenuated).
220. See Solid Waste 11, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1990).
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birds; and (3) other than the presence of the migratory birds, there
was no showing that the land would have any effect on interstate
commerce. 221 The record reflects that the petitioner may have put
forth a mitigation plan as part of the local review process, but this
was not at issue in the circuit court review. 222
Justice Thomas has asserted that the "point of Lopez was to
explain that the activity on the land to be regulated must substan-
tially affect interstate commerce before Congress can regulate it
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power."223 The Court has since
extended this requirement to mandate that the intrastate activity
was of an independent economic nature prior to its considered ef-
fect on interstate commerce. 224
In light of these facts, the use of the site as a habitat by the
migratory birds cannot be viewed as an economic activity, 225 and
the circuit court did not attempt to distinguish it as such. 226 In-
stead, the circuit court considered the vast amount of expendi-
tures made on a national basis relative to hunting, trapping and
the observation of migratory birds, and specifically referred to the
presence of these activities in neighboring states. 227
Upholding the circuit court's conclusion that the filling of iso-
lated wetlands could have a substantial effect on commerce is un-
likely in light of the higher standard imposed under Morrison.228
The Court, however, found similar reasoning in Morrison as insuf-
ficient, by itself, to establish the necessary nexus with interstate
commerce that was not so broad as to allow the federal govern-
ment to regulate everything in the path of the migratory birds in
the name of protecting interstate commerce. 229 Under the theory
put forth by the Corps, there would conceivably be no logical stop-
ping point to the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction. 230 The current
Supreme Court has certainly refused to agree with this reading of
governmental authority, asserting that "'we always have rejected
221. Id. at 848-49.
222. Id. at 851.
223. Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955,959 (1995).
224. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
225. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 507 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the activity must be economic in nature or at least present a plausible
case of future economic character and impact).
226. See Solid Waste II, 191 F.3d at 850.
227. Id. at 850.
228. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 n.8.
229. See id. at 615.
230. See Nat'l Ass'n Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1065 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
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readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power
that would permit Congress to exercise a police power' that tradi-
tionally belongs to the state."231
In the absence of economic activity, any enactment by Con-
gress claiming to be within the scope the Commerce Clause would
presumably be deemed an invalid exercise of federal authority
since "[elvery law enacted by Congress must be based on one or
more powers enumerated in the Constitution."232
Part VI
Federal Conditional Spending: An Alternative Approach
The Lopez Court removed non-economic local activities, whatever
their effect on interstate commerce, from the scope of federal reg-
ulatory power and indirectly made "discussion of federal condi-
tional spending meaningful once again."233 The Spending
Doctrine 234 allows Congress to use conditional offers of federal
funds to circumvent these restrictions. 23 5 In South Dakota v.
Dole,236 the majority held that Congress has the authority to im-
pose conditions on the receipt of funds, even to attain objectives it
might not be able to attain directly.237 The dissent asserted that
there must be a rational, or substantial relationship, between the
funding and the funding condition.238 The spending program
must be reasonably adapted to the attainment of an end that will
justify the expenditure.239
231. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
584-5 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring)); see also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (recognizing that "a state's power to regulate the use of water
... for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens ... is at the core of its police
power.").
232. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
233. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1919 (1995) (discussing the authority of Congress to achieve otherwise imper-
missible regulation of the states through conditional spending).
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to "provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.").
235. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that otherwise alloca-
ble federal funds could be withheld from states that did not comply with national
drinking age).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 208-09.
238. Id. at 213-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The Resource Conservation & Recovery Act as a Viable
Example of Conditional Federal Spending in the Area of
Environmental Legislation
The objectives of the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act
(RCRA) are to: "assist in developing and encouraging methods for
the disposal of solid waste that are environmentally sound . . .
accomplished through Federal technical and financial assistance
to States ... for comprehensive planning pursuant to Federal
guidelines designed to foster cooperation among Federal, State,
and local governments and private industry."240 Under RCRA,
the EPA has the authority to approve a state plan for the disposal
of solid waste, and to allow state substitution of the regulatory
process if certain guidelines are met.241 To construct a municipal
solid waste landfill on a wetlands area, an owner must demon-
strate that: (1) a practicable alternative to the use of the wetland
area is unavailable; 242 (2) the construction or operation of the
landfill will not cause or contribute to violations of any applicable
state water quality standards, jeopardize the continued existence
of endangered species or critical habitats, or violate any require-
ment for the protection of a marine sanctuary;243 (3) the landfill
will not cause or contribute to significant degradation of wet-
lands;244 and (4) proactive or mitigating steps have been taken to
prevent or minimize wetland impact. 245 These RCRA wetlands
provisions mirror the EPA's section 404 guidelines concerning
wetlands under the CWA.246
In Resource Investments Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,247 the Ninth Circuit considered whether section 404 of
the CWA authorized the Corps to require the owner to obtain a
NPDES permit prior to constructing a municipal solid waste land-
fill on a wetlands site.248 The company sought to construct and
operate a municipal solid waste landfill on a 320-acre site that
240. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (2001).
241. Id. § 6947 (2001).
242. Criteria for Municipal Solid waste Landfills - Wetlands, 40 C.F.R. § 258.12(a)
(1) (2001).
243. Id. § 258.12(a)(2) (2001).
244. Id. § 258.12(a)(3) (2001).
245. Id. § 258.12(a)(4) (2001).
246. See Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for
Dredged or Fill Material - Restrictions on Discharge, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2001).
247. 151 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1998).
248. Id. at 1163; see also 33 U.S.C, § 1342 (2001). Section 402 of the CWA prohibits
the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters without a permit issued by the EPA
under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
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required clearing, filling and grading of approximately 21.6 acres
of the site's 70 acres of wetlands.249 Their application for a permit
under section 404 of the CWA was denied because they failed to
demonstrate the unavailability of practicable alternatives for
waste disposal that were less environmentally damaging.250 The
district court affirmed on the ground that the "Corps' decision was
not arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or an abuse of discre-
tion."251 The company appealed, and contended that the authority
to regulate solid waste landfills was vested with the EPA and not
the Corps.252 The Ninth Circuit held that the EPA under RCRA,
and not the CWA, exclusively regulates the construction of a mu-
nicipal solid waste landfill on a wetland site. 253
The EPA can look to this resolution in light of the potential
ramifications of the decision in Solid Waste III, to consider what
additional wetland determinations can be made by the states
under RCRA. The decision by the Ninth Circuit assigned respon-
sibility to the EPA to make these wetland determinations based
on the breadth of its solid waste responsibilities under RCRA, and
precludes further conflict in the circuit between two agencies that
both currently have statutory authority to make wetlands deter-
minations. 254 The court reasoned that the site, design and con-
struction of a solid waste landfill on a wetlands area was
specifically regulated under RCRA by the EPA, or, alternatively,
through a state with an EPA approved solid waste permit
program.255
RCRA survives the decision expected in Solid Waste III be-
cause it does not rely on the Commerce Clause for its authority.
RCRA is representative of the type of federal conditional spending
legislation "designed to foster cooperation among Federal, State,
and local governments and private industry"25 6 that can be suc-
cessful in the post-Solid Waste III era. Otherwise, states that de-
cide not to participate under RCRA will no longer be subject to
federal regulation over those isolated, intrastate wetlands with no
demonstrable interstate economic value.
249. Resource Investments, 151 F.3d at 1164.
250. Id. at 1165.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1169.
254. Id. at 1168-69.
255. Resource Investments, 151 F.3d at 1168-69
256. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1984).
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Part VII
Conclusion
The immediate effect of the Solid Waste III decision is two-
fold. First of all, any effort to impose the authority of the CWA can
only extend to navigable waters and adjacent wetlands. 257 As a
corollary, only a state possesses the authority to regulate land and
water use in isolated, intrastate wetlands. 258
Second, the language used by Congress in environmental leg-
islation must be sufficiently specific, or alternatively, there must
be another source of the clear intent of Congress to support regu-
latory interpretations. 259 Otherwise, the courts will have the dis-
cretion to strike down an environmental rule based on a finding
that the regulatory body exceeded its authority.
A third criterion is seen in the hypothetical judicial review of
the circuit court's "substantial effects" analysis. When considered
in light of Lopez, Morrison and the dicta expressed in Solid Waste
III, environmental activities that are otherwise within the prov-
ince of the state's traditional authority may be subject to federal
regulation, under a commerce clause theory, only if there is a de-
monstrable and sufficient economic activity that affects interstate
commerce.
260
Finally, federal spending legislation presents state legisla-
tures with the need to evaluate a complex set of incentives and
disincentives regarding whether they should participate in the
voluntary program. Compliance with federal guidelines will bring
added resources to the state in terms of funding, but comes at the
expense of potential restrictions on residential and business devel-
opment. Alternatively, maintenance of open space improves the
quality of residential life, enhances property value, and facilitates
the protection of a diverse, independent ecosystem. The general
population must provide a clear direction to its elected officials
through the political process to ensure that their wishes regarding
environmental protection are known, and that legislators do not
rely solely on the input of special interest groups.
State governments may then effectively exercise their tradi-
tional authority over the health and safety of its citizens, and ini-
257. Solid Waste III, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 173-74.
260. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000); see also Solid Waste
111, 531 U.S at 193; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
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tiate environmental legislation to protect areas no longer
protected under federal legislation. States could theoretically
seek to balance the interests of its diverse economic and environ-
mental interests. Such state action would be consistent with the
federalist philosophy underpinning the Supreme Court's decision.
The risk, however, is a return to the environmental negligence
and lack of legislative supervision that led to the application of
federal laws in the first place. The presumption that developers
and businesses will misuse the environment in the absence of pro-
tective federal or state legislation may or may not be valid; how-
ever, the states cannot permit themselves the luxury of
procrastination in this regard.
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